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ABSTRACT 
This paper is about the notions of the artistic, aesthetic, cognitive and moral value of art 
and their (possible) interconnectedness. The main concern is to try to advocate the cogni-
tivist claim about the artistic value of artworks’ contribution to the advance of knowl-
edge, as well as for the relevance of the moral dimension for artistic value. This is a dis-
cussion of the intersection of the debate about moral and aesthetic value. The central part 
of the paper is focused on a debate with Peter Lamarque. The problem of immoral art-
works and their cognitive value is discussed at the end of this paper in order to show that 
they are counterexamples of the thesis of artistic relevance of the moral dimension. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper is about the cognitive and moral value of art. Precisely, this pa-
per is about the value artworks have in virtue of being exemplars of art. This 
is a debated issue because reasons for valuing art seem to differ across differ-
ent eras, cultures, and persons. Some people value art for its pleasure and lei-
sure, some for the way it gives us an opportunity to gain insights about dif-
ferent situations and (fictional) characters, and some for the education it 
may afford. There are several objections to the idea of finding one unified 
fundamental reason for why we value art, but we don’t think that these dif-
ferences should force us to give up and conclude that an appreciation of art is 
too varied to say something about its value in general terms.  
The Moral and Cognitive Value of Art 
475 
 
To start, we can say that there is wide-spread agreement about what 
does not constitute the artistic value of artworks. For example, the value we 
are speaking about is not the amount of money that one can receive for a 
picture that one is selling. We call this the market value of art, i.e. the value 
that artworks have in virtue of their particular place in the market. It is not 
controversial to say that the market value of an artwork is not a characteris-
tic that is relevant in establishing the artistic value of the artwork. We can 
try to explain this common stance in various ways. We can say, for example, 
that the market value depends, in great part, on contingencies and is apt to 
be variable. We can say that this same, or a similar value, can in general be 
realized by other means. For example, a person who needs money can obtain 
it by deciding to sell her car instead of a picture that she possesses. In this 
paper, we put the issue of the artistic value of artworks in terms of the prop-
er focus a person has when she approaches an artwork as artwork. The value 
of artworks that we are speaking about is the value that a person cannot ne-
glect if she wants to properly consider the artwork as artwork.1 It is not re-
grettable if one neglects the market value of an artwork if one considers its 
artistic value. Neglecting some other features, however, represents a failure 
in approaching the artwork from the standpoint of its artistic value.  
Despite such values from which we can uncontroversially distinguish ar-
tistic value, there are disputed issues. There are debates, for example, about 
whether the epistemological contribution of an artwork is a part of its value 
as artwork. James O. Young, for example, is one of the authors who most 
radically claims that considering how much an artwork contributes to the 
improvement of our knowledge is a part of evaluating it as an artwork (fur-
thermore, he says that this is important to establish whether something is 
even an artwork at all) (Young, 2001). There is an intense debate about 
whether the moral dimension of an artwork influences it artistic value, and, 
again, we can put the question in terms of whether we artistically approach 
an artwork properly if we let its moral dimension influence our artistic 
judgment about it, and how.  
 
 
2. Subject, theme, aboutness, seriousness  
 
Peter Lamarque is the principal author who we discuss in this paper. His 
                                                 
1 Here we follow (Lamarque and Olsen, 1994, 255-257 and Lamarque, 2010, 101-103) 
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specific interest is in the philosophy of literature, but we extend his theses to 
other art forms as well, and debate them in this broader context. In his con-
siderations of what is proper in evaluating an artwork as artwork he says 
that “the design, form, and the structure of verbal artifact; the presentation 
of a subject with a reasonable degree of coherence and connectedness; and 
the development of a thematic interest that allows for deeper, more far-
reaching reflection on, and beyond, the particularities of the subject” 
(Lamarque, 2009, 258) are all expectations that readers have when ap-
proaching works of art.  The value of art resides on the quality of experience 
that artwork yields and, for Lamarque, it is based on “two broad dimen-
sions: imaginativeness or creativity evident in design of the work, and the 
richness of its content at both subject and thematic levels” (Lamarque, 2009, 
259). We will now dedicate a few words to explain the distinction between 
the subject and the theme of an artwork. Both, the subject and the theme re-
lated to the artwork. To explore a work’s subject is to detect what it is im-
mediately about, to speak of its explicit preoccupation, to retell its content, 
specify its main characters, events, emotions.  
On the other hand, the theme includes much more than interpretative 
statements on the subject. When we speak of the interpretation of the 
theme, we are speaking of identifying the subject matter or the artwork’s 
immediate content; and we are taking into account the whole perspective 
and vision the artwork is offering. Successful literature exposes its theme in 
an illuminating way and calls upon wider and more extensive interpretation. 
This differentiation between subject and theme is explicated by Lamarque 
with examples like Shakespeare’s Macbeth, King Lear, Othello. To that we 
add the example of the film: The Lives of Others (Das Leben der Anderen). 
The subject of the movie is a secret police agent’s preoccupation with the 
lives of a writer and his lover to whom he is conducting surveillance on. On 
the thematic level it is a movie about the control hidden powers exercise on 
the lives of people. “Posing a stark, difficult question — how does a good 
man act in circumstances that seem to rule out the very possibility of decent 
behavior? — it illuminates not only a shadowy period in recent German his-
tory, but also the moral no man’s land where base impulses and high princi-
ples converge. Mr. von Donnersmarck, born in West Germany in 1973 and 
making his feature film debut, demonstrates astonishing visual and narra-
tive rigor. Even more remarkably, he is able to reach back into the totalitar-
ian past and over the Berlin Wall into the grim, brutal absurdity of the late, 
unlamented German Democratic Republic, and lay bare the anxious, cruel 
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psychology of socialism as it once existed” (Scott, NYT). “You expect the 
movie to focus on the charismatic couple and their "subversive" activities 
(they drink, party with artistic friends of questionable political correctness, 
and have sex!), but "The Lives of Others" is really about the observer, the 
anonymous little gray man. He's supposed to maintain his distance, but the 
lives of the others he's monitoring begin to infiltrate his own consciousness” 
(Emerson) “If there is any justice, this year’s Academy Award for best for-
eign-language film will go to “The Lives of Others,” a movie about a world 
in which there is no justice” (Lane).2 
Many different artworks may share a common subject, but on their 
thematic level they are different. Each artwork explores and demonstrates 
its own theme, through representing its concept and vision, preferably in an 
illuminating way, irrespective of whether it shares the subject with many 
other artworks. Lamarque‘s example is represented by: Marlowe’s, Sopho-
cles’s and Mann’s versions of Faust myth (Lamarque, 2009, 151). Literary 
critics tend to usually generalize works, and try to formulate thematic 
statements, which, in Lamarque’s sense are the unifying vision of the art-
work. Also, some philosophers of art think that the issue of truth in the in-
terpretation on a thematic level is a central concern when engaging with the 
artwork. But, we will explore Lamarque’s critique of cognitive value of art-
works hereafter.   
In order to show Lamarque’s stance more completely, it is important to 
remark on the element of seriousness in art. As he says”: “The point is that 
we can acknowledge the power and seriousness of literature, even its ‘cogni-
tive’ nature, without supposing that its seriousness (value) lies in its ability 
to advance knowledge. […] When a novelist (Kafka, say, or Beckett) pre-
sents a pessimistic or nihilistic view of the world we can take pleasure from 
the novel and value it as literature without endorsing the vision portrayed. 
The interest is in how powerfully, effectively, and originally the vision is de-
veloped. That is a literary interest, not any empirical, philosophical or socio-
logical support for the vision that might or might not be forthcoming from 
outside” (Lamarque, 2010, 80). “Some philosophers of literature are uneasy 
with the underlying thought that literary works can only be good if they 
have an educative function. That need not be the way to understand the 
‘usefulness’ of poetry. The mistake is to suppose that to be serious or reflec-
tive a work must in effect teach something. Yet there is no such implication. 
                                                 
2 These quotations are critic's reviews of the film The Lives of Others  
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A work is serious if it treats of a serious subject matter.3 But it can do that 
without being true and without presenting a view that ought to be en-
dorsed” (Lamarque, 2009, 258). 
As we see, seriousness is constituted by various elements. Some of them 
are related to the way the content is presented (power, effectiveness and 
originality), others are related to the content as such: “A work is serious if it 
treats of a serious subject matter”. More precisely, a serious subject matter is 
something of perennial human interest, typically deep moral issues.  
Lamarque’s thesis is that it is only relevant that the artwork is about 
such issues and that it develops this content with artistic values as those in-
dicated above, but it is never artistically important that it, for example, ad-
vances our knowledge about what it treats, or contributes to improve our 
morally. On the contrary, we think that, endorsing the element of serious-
ness of artworks as a necessary element of their value, establishes the ad-
vance of knowledge or improvement of morality as values, as well.  
3. Aesthetic and artistic values 
 
The next section is dedicated to terminological clarity. In the current de-
bates the distinction between “aesthetic” and “artistic” is not always clear. 
In some cases the distinction is not a problem. There are authors who say 
that the two completely overlap and thus define aesthetic value in narrow 
terms.  Just as there are authors for whom the formal properties of the art-
work are sufficient to establish the aesthetic and the artistic value of art-
works.  
“Artistic value” and “aesthetic value” are the equivalent of Berys Gaut, 
as well, but for opposed reasons, i.e., because he introduces several compo-
nents in the aesthetic value. More precisely, Gaut speaks about the differ-
ence between wide and narrow aesthetic value. He claims that wide aesthetic 
value and artistic value are, actually, one and the same and they capture 
more than the formal (or beautiful) properties of works. Gaut claims that ar-
tistic theory, or wide aesthetic theory, should show not just that additional 
properties and values (such as cognitive and ethical) interact with aesthetic 
properties in a narrow sense, but that sometimes these qualities of art are 
aesthetic properties. (Gaut, 2007, 40.) Schellekens sees artistic value as the 
                                                 
3 Here the expression “subject matter” mustn’t be confused with the expression “subject” 
that we have defined above. “Subject matter” here refers most interestingly to what we 
indicated as the theme of the artwork. 
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value that art has in virtue of being a work of art, and as a value that can 
encompass different kinds of values, where the moral and aesthetic values 
are especially important for the intrinsic value of art. We see that in contrast 
to Gaut, Schellekens does not consider moral value as a possible part of the 
aesthetic value, even not if broad understood. The two concepts are distin-
guished, although they can both be part of the artistic value of an artwork. 
(Schellekens, 2007, 41) 
Lamarque defines artistic value by making a difference between intrinsic 
and instrumental value. For artwork to be artistically valuable it has to be 
intrinsically valuable as a work of art, and it has to be response dependent 
(Lamarque, 2009, 233). In contrast to previously mentioned authors, 
Lamarque refuses to ascribe cognitive (and moral) values to the merit of in-
trinsic value. Also, he notices that there is a great difference between artistic 
and aesthetic value (in a narrow sense)4, since there is no explicit notion of 
what aesthetic is, and because of the examples of artworks that are not aes-
thetically valuable (in a sense of aesthetic usually grasped as beautiful). In 
addition, there are objects that are beautiful but are not pieces of art. Be-
sides that, there are artworks that are anti-aesthetic or non-aesthetic, but if 
understood using a wider concept of aesthetic value5 they can still be aes-
thetically valuable. Aesthetic value is sometimes conceived as analogous to 
perception, while artistic value is more similar to interpretation (Lamarque, 
2009, 18). It seems that Lamarque does advocate that aesthetic value (in a 
wider conception) can be a critical value (artistic value) that an artwork can 
yield, as long as it is intrinsically valuable for the artwork as a work of art.  
We intend to remain neutral in this paper in relation to the issue about 
whether cognitive and moral value are part of the broad aesthetic value 
(that is equivalent to artistic value), or are values of artworks additional to 
aesthetic value. The important thing for us is to have concepts distinguished 
from narrow aesthetic value. Dependently of the authors that we discuss in 
various parts of the paper we will use artistic value or aesthetic value as op-
                                                 
4 Lamarque takes Gaut’s differentiation of narrow and wide notions of aesthetic values, in 
Philosophy of Literature, 18. 
5 A wider conception of aesthetic value relates to cases of non-aesthetic and anti-aesthetic 
examples. Lamarque concludes that: “Whenever we talk about the way something is 
achieved (an effect, a response) we are potentially in a realm of aesthetic. As for the anti-
aesthetic work, it is not entirely paradoxical to speak of a successful, even the aesthetical-
ly successful, use of ugly, repellent or shocking elements in bringing about some artistic 
end” (Lamarque 2009, 234).   
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posed to narrow aesthetic value. 
 
 
3. The importance of cognitive and moral value of artworks 
 
Now we go back to our discussion with Lamarque about whether cognitive 
value and moral values are a part of the aesthetic value of artworks. The de-
bate about moral values, for Lamarque, starts not with asking whether 
moral thoughts and beliefs are present in works of art, because this is a fact 
that Lamarque finds obvious, but in questions concerning the relevance and 
status of these values. Namely, the aim of the debate is to discuss whether 
moral value is one of the reasons that contributes to the evaluation of liter-
ary works as works of art. In a similar way, Lamarque is ready to take for 
granted that art can contribute to the advance of knowledge, as well. For 
example, “Plenty of social history can be learned from the novel [Felix Holt, 
the Radical, by George Elliot], at whatever degree of reliability, but that 
kind of learning was never in dispute by the no-truth theorist”. (Lamarque, 
2009, 106) 
So, what is at dispute? “The crucial point for the cognitivist […] is how 
important it is from a literary point of view to impart truth (or beliefs)” 
(Lamarque, 2009, 106). This is at stake in the debate. Lamarque does not 
deny that literary works can advance knowledge. He only denies this as an 
aspect of the literary importance of a work. Similarly, Lamarque’s thesis 
that moral values should not be included as a part of the intrinsic values of 
literary works is visible, as well: “To value a literary work for its own sake is 
not to value it for the truths it imparts or for the morality of its vision or for 
its ability to improve human lives. The great works of literature are not 
great because they make better or more moral or more knowledgeable read-
ers but because they offer something strikingly unique, they show the very 
limits to which the medium of language can be stretched, and they create a 
‘world’ or a vision often far beyond the powers of imagination of mere mor-
tals” (Lamarque, 2010, 80).  
On the contrary, we try to show that there are artworks which are artis-
tically evaluated, among else, for their moral and epistemological elements, 
and argue that we cannot neglect these elements when we access these art-
works as artworks. Precisely, we say that if, as Lamarque requires, we en-
dorse thematic seriousness and depth as one of the values of art, then it fol-
lows that the advance of knowledge and moral improvement are artistic val-
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ues, as well. As we remark, our thesis is conditional to the acceptance of seri-
ousness in the sense of a serious engagement with issues of deep human in-
terest. We do not deny here that art can be serious for other reasons, as well, 
as, for example, the employment of artistic techniques for amusement, or the 
simple wish to have experiences that we cannot have in everyday life. These 
can be, for example, foundations for the value of immoral art, and, therefore, 
lead to positions like immoralism, or even a denial of the possibility of estab-
lishing features with a stable valence in relation to the values of art. In the 
latter case, various, even opposed features, can contribute to the artistic 
value of the artwork, but they do this as contributory reasons, i.e. as reasons 
that are variable in their valence. For example, there may be cases where a 
negative moral value contributes positively to the artistic value of the art-
work, while in other cases a moral flaw is the reason of the artistic flaw of 
the artwork, as well.6 But our concern is with the position of Lamarque who, 
although he remarks on the seriousness of art, says that it doesn’t matter at 
all for the artistic value of an artwork whether it advances knowledge or has 
a positive moral contribution. In our opinion, if the importance of serious-
ness is endorsed, then the advance of knowledge, or improvement of moral-
ity are required, as well.  
To be sure, we do not say that moral and cognitive values are sufficient 
for having artistic value, even in the case that thematic seriousness is taken 
as crucial. That would really correspond to a reduction of the value of art to 
that of philosophy or sciences. This is a result that Lamarque firmly wants 
to avoid (Lamarque and Olsen, 1994, 6, 22; cfr. Currie, 1995, 911) and we 
share his position on this. Consequentially, we do not say, for example, that 
works like Uncle Tom’s Cabin are great literary works. We agree with La-
marque and many others on the example of Uncle Tom’s Cabin that cer-
tainly has a relevant moral message but is nonetheless not valuable as a 
great artwork (Lamarque, 2009, 287). In our discussion we refer to artworks 
which are of high quality because of the different virtues they have, and 
among them moral or cognitive value. 7 
In a different case the problem is not to recognize the status of high 
value given to artworks that do not deserve it, but that of not recognizing 
                                                 
6 For typologies of theses on the value of art, see Carroll, (2000), Jacobson (2006), 
Schelleckens, (2007, 64-88).  
7 But, as it will be clearer later, didactic works like Uncle Tom’s Cabin is not at the high-
est level if we consider cognitive values, as well. 
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the proper status of high value to those artworks that deserve it. Let’s think 
about Sophocles’s Oediphus. The tragedy considers the question of moral fate 
in a challenging way that can be taken as its theme. More precisely, we can 
take as the theme of the tragedy the influence of moral luck on moral virtue. 
Suppose that we do not agree with Sophocles' view on moral fate. Do we 
have, by this, to declare a diminished value of the tragedy? Or, think about 
Euripide’s Hecuba, which theme may be that “nothing human is ever wor-
thy of trust: there are no guarantees at all, short of revenge or 
death”.(Lamarque, 2009, 253) The view is clearly too pessimistic. Does this 
have any influence on our appreciation of the work? We agree with what 
Lamarque says in a previous quotation about an analogous case, i.e. that 
“When a novelist (Kafka, say, or Beckett) presents a pessimistic or nihilistic 
view of the world we can take pleasure from the novel and value it as litera-
ture without endorsing the vision portrayed” (Lamarque, 2010, 80). But how 
is our acceptance of such a stance compatible with our claim that one of the 
values of artworks consists in the advance of knowledge? 
We recognize the way the authors that we have mentioned are engaged 
with their themes as contributing to the high artistic value of their works ir-
respective of whether we are ready to accept the perspective of the themes or 
not. But in contrast to Lamarque, although we admit cases when, despite an 
artworks lack of cognitive value may be highly estimated in virtue of having 
an aesthetic value in the narrow sense,8 we think that considerations about 
whether the works play a part in advancing knowledge also contributes to 
their artistic evaluation. If we suppose that Oediphus’s vision on moral fate, 
or the visions promoted in  Euripides's and Kafka’s works are wrong, we can 
nevertheless say that there are further epistemological benefits asides from 
directly offering new truths, and that these benefits contribute to increase 
these works’ artistic value. It could be, for example, that an artwork 
enlightens aspects of a vision that we do not endorse, of which we were not 
aware. Our refusal to endorse that vision was naïve and not well founded. At 
the same time, because of this, the vision we endorsed, although broadly 
true, was naïve and not well founded. So, the artwork, although not directly 
offering truths, advances our knowledge through challenges and, thus, 
through offering improvements to what we believed earlier. But this is not a 
particularity for artworks only. We highly evaluate mutually inconsistent 
scientific and philosophical theories, although they are opposed and cannot 
                                                 
8 Cf. Young (2001, 108). 
The Moral and Cognitive Value of Art 
483 
 
be true at the same time. Take for example, the works of Hume and Kant. 
They cannot at the same time present rightful positions about ethics or 
metaethics, and perhaps moral stances about suicide and other moral issues, 
but we value them because they enlighten the debate and offer unavoidable 
challenges for opposing positions.9 When we say this we think about episte-
mological benefits like those remarked by John Stuart Mill in his On Lib-
erty. As Mill says, a position may be relevant even if it is not true. First, it 
may be partly true, and, therefore, help to improve the opposed position 
that is partly true, as well. Second, it stimulates us to rethink about the po-
sition we endorse. This may be beneficial, even if the position we endorse is 
fully true, because this prevents that position from becoming dogmatic (Mill 
[1859], 1977, 228-259). In our opinion, great artworks, as well as great scien-
tific and philosophical theories, have these merits even when they offer the 
wrong perspectives. In particular, it is important to remark upon the rela-
tion with the former of the two values that Mill indicates, because, as Young 
says, it is difficult that great artworks offer perspectives that are completely 
wrong. Young speaks of exemplars of great Christian art (like the Divine 
Comedy) and, similar to what we have done in relation to the artworks we 
mentioned above, he says that it would be absurd to declare them as unwor-
thy if Christianity would be proved to be mistaken. Nevertheless, as he says, 
these works “can demonstrate the rightness of perspectives on mourning, re-
demption, forgiveness, charity and other matters” (Young, 2001, 109). A 
similar point is said in (Gaut, 2006, 123). 
 
 
4. Can there be a concept of depth deprived of a contribution to knowledge? 
 
Let’s remember that the relevance of the contribution to the advance of 
knowledge for the artistic value of art is related to what Lamarque himself 
puts forward as one of the main aspects of his theory, i.e. that artworks 
(Lamarque speaks specifically about literary works) must be serious and 
deep in the sense of being engaged with issues of deep human concern. How-
ever, he thinks that this has nothing to do with the advance of knowledge: 
“What gives [to an artwork] depth is not so much that it implies a true 
proposition, but that it can be interpreted as about humanly interesting con-
cerns […] No doubt a different artistic treatment could present a theme of 
                                                 
9 Cf. Gaut, (2006, 123). 
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equal interest albeit formulated in a proposition which is the precisely nega-
tion of this one. It is the content of the proposition, what it is about, not its 
truth as such, that confers interest” (Lamarque and Olsen, 1994, 329-330). 
On the contrary, we do not see how the engagement might be qualified as se-
rious and deep if it does not contribute to advancing knowledge (or moral at-
titude, as we discuss later). We blame engagements in art that lack this vir-
tue in the same way as we consider it to be sophistry when philosophy en-
gages with deep and important issues without contributing to an advance of 
knowledge about them, and with the only merit of showing virtuosity in the 
elaboration of arguments. This is the reason why we qualify authors like 
Oscar Wilde or Gabriele D’Annunzio (think about his The Child of Pleasure) 
as being less valuable than Dante and Shakespeare even when they include 
deep issues in their works, and they show high virtuosity in literary skills. In 
a similar way, Young speaks of Wilde by remarking upon the example of 
The Importance of Being Earnest. As he says, “This play is certainly one of 
the most delightful comedies in the English language. Despite its enormous 
hedonic value, however, I do not think that it is a great work of art” 
(Young, 2001, 108).  
Lamarque might partially share this view, but says that the reason for 
the reduced artistic value in the cases we indicated is not related to a defect 
in the advance of knowledge, but with a different failure in respect of the re-
quirement of a valuable treatment of a deep issue. To be sure, he does not 
accept the equivalence of criticism for the absence of depth in philosophy 
(qualified as sophistry) with the absence of depth in art (Lamarque, 2006, 
134). However, again, our position is that we do not know what would be a 
valuable treatment of a deep issue apart from a contribution to the advance 
of knowledge on that issue. In describing depth in the treatment of a theme, 
Lamarque, for example, indicates “originality, lack of cliché, attention to de-
tail, and so forth, rather than truth” (Lamarque, 2006, 130), or coherence, 
complexity as opposed to simple-mindedness, and having a fruitful imagina-
tive development. (Lamarque, 2006, 139) We, however, doubt that all of 
these values are separated from the goal of the advance of knowledge. Lack 
of originality is a flaw in the advance of knowledge because, trivially, repeat-
ing what is already known, or illustrating something in a way that is already 
known, cannot advance knowledge. We can say the same about a lack of cli-
ché that is a specific case of lack of originality. Attention to details and com-
plexity are valuable as a means to a nuanced and sophisticated knowledge. 
We can certainly imagine that all these virtues can be separated from the 
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advance of knowledge, but our opinion is that, if seriousness and depth of 
the theme are among central values, an artwork that shows attention to de-
tails and complexity for its own sake must be blamed as ‘ornamentalistic’, 
precisely as it happens with D’Annunzio’s works. In other places, Lamarque 
remarks on the proper attention to a literary work as directed to “its struc-
ture and tone, its use of dialogue as rhetorical device, its wit, its irony, or the 
consonance of ends and means” (Lamarque, 2006, 132). We do not disagree 
that these are aesthetic values in a narrow sense, as we do not deny this for 
some of the values in the previous lists. However, having values in the nar-
row sense is insufficient to account for one of the elements that Lamarque 
remarks in artistic evaluation, i.e. the seriousness and depth of the theme of 
the artwork. In our opinion, Lamarque faces the challenge of providing a 
concept of depth that is totally deprived of contribution to the advance of 
knowledge, and he does not respond satisfactorily to this challenge.  
We are here at the point of central disagreement with Lamarque. As we 
have shown, he rejects the thesis that depth in arts can be judged in terms of 
the advance of knowledge, while we say that this is the proper way. What 
else can we say for the debate?  
 
 
5. Normative and empirical considerations 
 
One of the grounds of the debate is represented by the practice of art criti-
cism as revealing what are the intentions of art (Lamarque, as always, refers 
specifically to literature). The positions, here, are divided. Rowe (1997, 324-
327, 335-337) and Blackburn (2010, 85-88) object to Lamarque by trying to 
show examples that refuse his thesis, while Lamarque remarks that concerns 
about the truth of the vision of an artwork, or its relation to knowledge, are 
not at the focus of art criticism: “There is an absence of argument about 
whether or not a particular proposition or set of propositions implied in a lit-
erary work is true or false. Indeed, critical work is ended when it has been 
demonstrated how such a general proposition or set of propositions organizes 
the various features of a work into a meaningful pattern. […] Debate about 
the truth or falsity of the propositions implied by a literary work is absent 
from literary criticism since it does not enter into the appreciation of the 
work as a literary work” (Lamarque and Olsen, 1994, 332, 334; see also: 
Lamarque, 2006, 134-135; Lamarque, 2009, 237; Lamarque, 2010, 101-103). 
We do not argue about the empirical fact – about whether as a matter of fact 
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dominant strands in art criticism are so detached from concerns of the art-
works contribution to the advance of knowledge. Indeed, empirical fact is 
not Lamarque’s central concern, although for him this issue is very im-
portant, because artistic practice and art, with the corresponding legitimate 
expectations and values related to them, are something this institutional 
practice shapes. The norms, therefore, depend on the practice as it is formed. 
However, we think that it is possible to approach the normative claim sepa-
rately from empirical consideration. We express doubts about whether we 
can conceive art criticism separated from concerns about the advance of 
knowledge as something that we can appreciate.  
We agree with Berys Gaut who says that it would be bizarre to say 
something like “This novel is a profound and insightful exploration of death 
without a trace of sentimentality, but this of course has nothing to do with 
its artistic merits” (Gaut, 2006, 122). The first reply that might be available 
to Lamarque consists in saying that the qualification of ‘profound and in-
sightful exploration’ has nothing to do with the advance of knowledge. But, 
as we have already said, we disagree with Lamarque’s qualification of the 
crucial terms. 
Gaut tries to strengthen his position by a thought example. He starts 
with Lamarque’s consideration that Dickens’s novel Our Mutual Friend is 
appreciable not for the advance of knowledge that it offers, but for the way 
how it organizes the theme of the results of the false worship of money and 
organizes and makes sense of the particularities of the novel. Gaut’s thought 
experiment consists in thinking about a novel, Our Common Enemy, that is 
equally successful in organizing its theme and making sense of its particular-
ities, but that has as its theme that the worship of money is the greatest of 
human goods (Gaut, 2006, 125-126). Contrary to what Gaut suggests, it is 
not absurd to imagine such an example, because it is not difficult to think 
about examples of artworks that advance an immoral worldview, or an un-
true worldview, or difficult to believe, and it is at least problematic to ex-
clude them from the evaluation of great artistic merits.10 But we would say 
the same about philosophy, and our hypothesis is that in such cases there are 
cognitive gains of the kinds we have described above when we mentioned 
                                                 
10 Here we disagree with Rowe, as well: “If, however, the proposition actually implied by 
a work is false or silly, then this will infect large tracts of the work: in all likelihood the 
concrete incidents will be imperfectly imagined, the drama forced, the motives implausi-
ble” (Rowe, 1997, 333). 
The Moral and Cognitive Value of Art 
487 
 
J.S. Mill.  
Lamarque makes a different move in responding to Gaut (Lamarque, 
2006, 138-139). He opposes such a theoretical approach that is (a) based on a 
thought experiment that starts with a thematic statements, that (b) looks 
for what kind of work it might characterize, and that (c) looks for what val-
ue this work might have. Lamarque says that literary interpretations “al-
ways begin with a specific work and reaches a judgment of value, if at all, on 
a plurality of measures” (Lamarque, 2006, 138). The work postulated by 
Gaut appears to have many failings (not being engaging, not being serious, 
not being plausible etc.), but there is no reason to assume that falsehood of 
the theme is one of them (Lamarque, 2006, 139).  
We agree with Lamarque that the proper way to discuss values in art is 
related to single works and with a plurality of measures.11 But the challenge 
for Lamarque, then, is to find canonical artworks that do not contribute to 
the advance of knowledge at least in the ways indicated by Mill, or that are 
not properly morally engaged. 
Gaut tries to support the cognitivist thesis by saying that we may judge 
that an artwork is of very high value, but would be of even higher value if it 
contributed better to the advance of knowledge. In relation to this, Gaut 
says that diverging in the artistic evaluation of artworks depending on world 
views is no fault: “It is simply a formalist dogma to insist that, despite their 
differing views of the world, two people must in principle always be able to 
agree on the exact artistic value of a work that expresses the views on which 
they differ” (Gaut, 2006, 124).  
Although Lamarque is not a formalist, this thesis applies against one of 
his claims. The claim is that if the realization of the advance of knowledge 
were an artistic criterion, then we would not, for example, have the possibil-
ity to access the value of, for example, an artwork that treats the question of 
free will before we establish what the truth on this issue is (Lamarque, 2006, 
138-139). But Lamarque is here mistaken. First, the epistemological merit, 
and at the same time the artistic value, may be assessed before resolving 
what the truth on this issue is. The same as in philosophy, reaching the truth 
is not the only epistemological merit, for example, offering a vision in an 
artwork may be enlightening and insightful without warranting truth. Se-
cond, as Gaut says, different people may assess the artwork differently, de-
pending on their view on the issue. This is precisely because the truth of the 
                                                 
11 Here, by agreeing with Lamarque, we disagree with (Rowe, 1997, 337-338). 
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view of an artwork is a disputed issue. To be sure, we don’t think that cogni-
tive value is the only component of artistic value. We can assess an artwork 
independently of its cognitive value by relying on its narrow aesthetic val-
ues. We only say that cognitive value is an additional element of the assess-
ment of the artistic value of artwork. 
But, coming back to Gaut’s argument, we note that an opponent of 
cognitivism may reply that here he admits an improper conflation of evalua-
tions.12 We leave this issue open here. But we indicate a consideration at the 
end of the paper that we find important for the resolution of this part of the 
debate, as well as of the debate in general, although we take this to be basi-
cally an ad hominem argument directed to Lamarque and consciously una-
ble to be convincing for many opponents of cognitivism.  
 
 
6. Further challenges 
 
We indicate now two further challenges that Lamarque directs toward the 
cognitivist view. He might rely on visible practices in art that reveal the dis-
interestedness in relation to issues of advance of knowledge. So, for example, 
Lamarque says that “as with many proverbs […] it seems not just difficult 
but curiously irrelevant to try to verify certain literary reflections. Literary 
sayings are just as likely as proverbs to contradict each other” (Lamarque, 
2009, 234). In Lamarque’s opinion, the fact that in different artworks there 
may be contradictory thematic statements neither diminishes their interest, 
nor their depth, and this is taken by Lamarque as evidence that it is not 
their truth that matters (Lamarque and Olsen, 1994, 330). Or, again, “A fur-
ther worry about the emphasis on truth, aside from concerns about verifia-
bility, is that these very general propositions are seldom defended or argued 
for in works of literature. This makes the literary context seem very different 
from the philosophic or scientific one, where evidence are paramount” 
(Lamarque, 2009, 234-235). While in philosophy or sciences, the author de-
fends and argues her view, because her major intention is to influence the 
view endorsed by the reader, in literature “there is no demand that he should 
                                                 
12 As Lamarque says in the book he wrote with Olsen, we never have a total appreciation 
of an artwork, but always an appreciation that depends on the specific focus (literary, 
moral, cognitive, or another) with which we approach that work (Lamarque and Olsen, 
1994, 393-397).  
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accept or reject the authorial perspective” (Lamarque and Olsen, 1994, 385). 
We think that we already have the material needed to reply to the first 
of these observations: contradictions between artworks are not a problem for 
two possible reasons that were visible when we were outlining Mill’s thesis. 
To recap, the first is that although a perspective is wrong, the way it is 
treated may nevertheless be instructive for the reasons we have shown 
above. The second is that perspectives of great artworks, as happens with 
many philosophical theories, are seldom totally wrong or totally true. The 
wise consumer of artworks compares these perspectives and advances her 
knowledge in this way. The basic fact here is that when different artworks 
ground different visions, “this does not show that truth is irrelevant to liter-
ary evaluation; it merely shows how difficult is to establish what the truth 
is” (Rowe, 1997, 338). 
The second objection corresponds to a matter of fact. We agree that the 
truths we can extrapolate from artworks “are seldom defended or argued for 
in works of literature”. But this does not prove that artworks are disinterest-
ed in relation to issues of knowledge, provided that they contribute to the 
advance of knowledge in a specific way that does not require defending or 
arguing particular statements. There are, for example, proposals that indi-
cate that this is not required because the primary way artworks contribute 
to the advance of knowledge is by reshaping beliefs that we already have. 
These debates are related to epistemological discussions of high reputation 
and interest, as, for example, Davies (2010) and Carroll (1998) relate the 
cognitivist issue in art with a more general debate on thought experiments, 
and Carroll (1996) refers to the notion of understanding, central in episte-
mology, as well as in moral epistemology. We find the role of art particularly 
instructive in offering a distinctive contribution to knowledge by illustrative 
representation as opposed to semantic representation, with the final result of 
reshaping of beliefs. This is the contribution to the debate offered by James 
Young (2001, 104-107). 
There appear to be authors ready to speak about arguments in literary 
works, such as Edward Harcourt, but we suspect that the difference between 
his position and those already shown is only verbal, because ‘argument’ for 
him means leading the reader to share a conviction. Harcourt explicitly de-
clares that he is not speaking about arguments employed as in philosophy or 
sciences. It seems to us that he is speaking about what other authors call ‘re-
shaping of beliefs.  
8. The advance of knowledge and artistic value 
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Before proceeding, some possible misunderstandings must be avoided. 
Lamarque could be ready to accept that the advance of knowledge can be 
obtained in the ways indicated by these authors. The point is how much this 
concerns his thesis that the advance of knowledge has nothing to do with the 
artistic value of artworks. As Lamarque puts it, the alternative is either to 
focus on the truth of the artwork’s statements and evaluate them, but if the 
evaluator does this she renounces the artistic stance, or construes a criticism 
of how the artwork develops its theme. “This would be a step in the aesthetic 
appreciation of the work, but it would not involve attributing to the work 
any truth-claim” (Lamarque and Olsen, 1994, 338). 
We don’t see the need for such an alternative. The first condition for the 
advance of knowledge is to apprehend the artwork as such. It is through this 
that members of the audience have the experience to advance their 
knowledge. To be sure, such an experience is not sufficient, because the same 
art techniques can advance or corrupt knowledge. Further reflection is need-
ed as well.  
At this point Lamarque could say not in defence of his theses that this 
reflection is external to the experience of the artwork, and, therefore, it is 
exactly proved that the issue of the advance of knowledge is separated from 
the assessment of the artwork as artwork. But, we don’t think that some-
thing like this is proved. There are other aspects of artistic merits that are 
assessed apart from the experience of the artwork. This is true, for example, 
for the assessment of the originality of the artwork. We assess the originality 
of an artwork only if we compare it with other artworks. In our view, the en-
joyment of the artwork can be an elaborated and extended process. It im-
plies, at least in some cases, the first experience of the artwork, further re-
flection upon it (that can imply even a reflection on elements external to the 
artwork) and an iterated experience of the artwork by enhanced members of 
the audience enhanced in their evaluative capacities.  
By this, we have answered another general concern that Lamarque ex-
presses against the contributions of knowledge we can have through art-
works (Lamarque’s argument is explicitly directed at Harcourt). As 
Lamarque says, such contributions may be double-edged: “Once we have 
departed from dispassionate reasoning (clearly, not the province of the nov-
el) we can never be quite confident of the grounds of the beliefs we acquire 
from fiction” (Lamarque, 2009, 106). To add to what we have already said, 
dangers are present in dispassionate reasoning as well, and it suffices to con-
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sider the conclusions of some philosophical arguments, even in the best phil-
osophical tradition, in the field of ethics and political philosophy.  
 
 
7. The necessity of evaluating some artworks with regards to the advance of 
knowledge: three examples 
 
We now offer some examples in order to strengthen our thesis that the 
evaluation of artworks on the basis of their contribution to the advance of 
knowledge is a part of the engagement with artworks that they require as 
artworks. We now show cases of literary works that more explicitly take as 
their proper mission exactly this, to advance knowledge, and for these 
works, in the aspects in which they want to do this, it would be clearly a ma-
jor failure to not be truthful or insightful. We offer three local examples, and 
one universally known example. The three local examples regard two theater 
pieces we have recently seen in Rijeka (Croatia). Two of them are a widely 
reworked The Miser by Moliere, and a widely reworked Euripides’s Bacchae, 
both directed by the director Oliver Frljic, the third one is an authorial pro-
ject by the director Borut Separovic called My Heart Beats for Her.  
Frljic’s The Miser and Bacchae are clear statements about political 
events in Croatia. Both are concerned with our former president Tudjman, 
and the former prime minister Sanader (whose voices and images appear in 
the pieces), as well as other politicians and events. In the first one, Sanader is 
identified with Moliere’s miser, in the second one, together with the rest of 
the former political establishment, Tudjman and Sanader are interpreted as 
corresponding to the cruel Dionysus of the Bacchae, the god who renders 
people mad, inciting them to violence for satisfying his pride, for revenge 
and for will of power.  
Frljic’s Bacchae are an attempt to interpret our recent war (and many 
such wars) and the theme of Bacchae in juxtaposition. In this process Frljic 
is trying to say something about the real world, not only to find the theme of 
Euripides's Bacchae. The connection with reality is even more evident in vir-
tue of the fact that the director puts a real person – the former prime minis-
ter – on the stage (his voice and his image).  
The relation with the real world is even more evident in Separovic’s 
piece, My Heart Beats for Her. There are three elements in this piece. One is 
the broadcast of the football match England-Croatia, won by the Croatian 
national team a few years ago. The other is represented by actresses playing 
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on the stage. The third element is represented by eleven women who come on 
the stage in order to speak about their real life stories concerning the process 
of transformation of the Croatian economic order from socialism to capital-
ism. The intention of the piece is to describe the dehumanized transfor-
mation we had from the socialist system to the market economy, as well as 
how football and nationalism work together as kinds of clouds that hide the 
social reality.  
These were our local examples. As a universally known example, we 
would mention Orwell’s 1984. The novel has an obvious intention to speak 
about a real phenomenon: the totalitarian regime. In fact, its description 
does not with precision reproduce any real case of a totalitarian regime. 
There have been no such regimes that have had exactly the features as de-
scribed by Orwell. But the novel advances our knowledge by employing in 
its description resources from literature. As three examples, we mention am-
plification, simplification and the remarking of details.13 By these means the 
work does not show precise facts about particular regimes, but it is effica-
cious in offering a valid insight about what it is like to live in a totalitarian 
regime (although the description is amplified). We think that the main vir-
tue of the novel is in this result.  
By these examples we have shown that there are at least some literary 
works that put as one of their primary intended achievements that of the 
advance of knowledge. As the producers of the works themselves would cer-
tainly admit, it would be a failure of the works if they would depict reality in 
the wrong way. Even from the standpoint of the public, these artworks lose 
a great part of their appeal if it is shown that they depict reality in a wrong 
way, as it would be the case, e.g., if 1984 were only a work of antisocialist 
propaganda wrongly showing a society characterized by the sense of com-
munity and solidarity. 
In the case of our local theater pieces critics were engaged in discussing 
whether reality is properly depicted in these pieces (this is particularly rele-
vant, because one of the pieces of evidence for Lamarque’s thesis is that crit-
ics are not usually engaged in discussions about whether literary works cor-
respond to reality).  
 
 
 
                                                 
13 For these, and other techniques used by literature, see Young (2001, 80-88) 
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8. Themes’ contribution to advance of knowledge  
 
A possible reply by Lamarque might be that in our examples, we refer to the 
subject level of the artworks, while what matters is the thematic level. As a 
consequence, what really matters in 1984 is not whether totalitarian regimes 
at his time and possible authoritarian regimes in our time have the features 
remarked by Orwell, because this is only the subject of the novel. What real-
ly matters is the theme of the novel, i.e. that of the social and political forces 
that are a constant threat for our lives, in any time as a perennial feature of 
human life. This is a theme of perennial and deep human interest and it con-
tributes, as such, to the high artistic value of 1984, independently of whether 
the particular regimes that inspired Orwell and that we have in mind when 
reading his novel are correctly depicted. In the same way, the themes in 
Shakespeare’s tragedies contribute to their high artistic values, independent-
ly of whether, for example the events regarding Brutus, Anthony, Cleopatra, 
Henry V, etc. are depicted in correspondence with the historic truth. Here 
the analogy may be with pictures. What is really important in a picture is 
not whether the face is really similar to the face of the person portrayed, but, 
for example, the moral character that is illustrated (Lamarque, 2006, 130-
131). 
Our first response to this is that it is only the issue of truth that is trans-
ferred. If what really matters are themes, than what really matters is the 
themes’ contribution to the advance of knowledge. For example, when 
speaking of 1984, we do not see what could be the interest of the novel if the 
concern of protecting individuals from totalitarian regimes would not be at 
least a possibility, even if not realized in the regimes to which Orwell’s novel 
associates us. In this sense, the contribution of 1984 is equivalent to that of 
J.S. Mill in his On Liberty, when he speaks about the future of democracy 
deprived of the institutions of freedom: “When society is itself the tyrant – 
society collectively, over the separate individuals who compose it – its means 
of tyrannizing are not restricted to the acts which it may do by the hands of 
its political functionaries. Society […] practices a social tyranny more for-
midable than many kinds of political oppression, since […] it leaves fewer 
means of escape, penetrating much more deeply into the details of life, and 
enslaving the soul itself” (Mill, 1977, 219-220).  
Or equivalent to that of Alexis de Tocqueville when he expresses similar 
concerns in his Democracy in America: “I want to imagine under what new 
features despotism could present itself to the world; I see an innumerable 
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crowd of similar and equal men who spin around restlessly, in order to gain 
small and vulgar pleasures with which they fill their souls. Each one of 
them, withdrawn apart, is like a stranger to the destiny of all the others; his 
children and his particular friends form for him the entire human species; as 
for the remainder of his fellow citizens, he is next to them, but he does not 
see them; he touches them without feeling them; he exists only in himself 
and for himself alone, and if he still has a family, you can say that at least he 
no longer has a country. Above those men arises an immense and tutelary 
power that alone takes charge of assuring their enjoyment and of looking af-
ter their fate” (Tocqueville [1835], 2010, 1248-1250). 
Lamarque knows that cognitivists try to find the space for the artistic 
relevance of the advance of knowledge at the level of themes, but he denies 
that this is a good attempt. Thus, he says that an assessment of the truth of 
the theme is not relevant at all: “In the literary context what matters pre-
eminently is whether a purported theme (as concept or proposition) helps 
give significance and coherence to the details of a work and thereby become 
a focus for reflecting on the work as a whole. A bare thematic statement on 
its own is of little intrinsic interest even from a literary point of view for 
what matters is not the summary itself but how the theme is elicited and 
supported through an imaginative reconstruction […] of the work in de-
tailed interpretation” (Lamarque, 2006, 137). 
We agree with Lamarque that the bare thematic statement on its own is 
of little importance and that what matters is how the theme is elicited and 
supported. But we would say the same about conclusions of most philosoph-
ical theories, as well. The difference with Lamarque is that we think that the 
way how the theme is elicited and supported is important, amongst other 
things, in order to evaluate the artworks contribution to the advance of 
knowledge. Here, Lamarque is skeptical: “To dwell on the worldly truth of a 
thematic proposition can seem a remote and pedestrian preoccupation” 
(Lamarque, 2006, 137). The most important reason is that “such general 
propositions are rarely demonstrably true or false” (Lamarque, 2006, 137). 
We agree with this, the same as we would in relation to many philosophical 
theories, or conclusions from them. What counts in the case of philosophy, 
as in the case of art, is the way how these general propositions are supported. 
An artwork, for example, in virtue of its artistic merits can represent a con-
vincing illustration of a general proposition and, therefore, can help to shed 
light on our beliefs, or reshape them, as, e.g., in various forms say the au-
thors we mentioned earlier in relation to this issue (Carroll, Davies, Young). 
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9. Truth at the subject level 
 
To be sure, we do not think that the issue of truth at the subject level can be 
dismissed so easily. It would be strange if this were so, because “an appre-
hension of the subject is necessary for the apprehension of a literary work” 
(Lamarque and Olsen, 1994, 260). There are cases of artworks that are di-
rected to specific situations, like most what frequently happens in political 
theatre that is intended to improve the consciousness of people in order to 
change a social or political situation. Let’s think of a play like Brecht’s The 
Resistible Rise of Arturo Ui. The play clearly has a primary intention i.e. 
that of admonishing people about the nature of Hitler’s regime. We agree 
with Lamarque that in order to be qualified as an artwork among those real-
ly great, the artwork must include, amongst  other things, a theme of uni-
versal and perennial human interest and not be too related to a specific con-
text. Perhaps The Resistible Rise of Arturo Ui is not even one of the greatest 
works among Brecht’s, but it nevertheless has the features of an artwork of 
permanent value because of the fact that through the specific subject it 
speaks of a theme of permanent human interest (the rise of wicked authori-
tarian politicians supported by corrupted centers of power). Nonetheless, we 
think that, although they are not so permanently valuable and although 
they cannot be masterpieces, artworks that are only directly relevant to a 
specific social and political situation are nevertheless valuable. Denying 
them any artistic value would support a tendency of depriving humanity of 
an important resource. We will return to this point later.  
For the moment it is, nonetheless, important to remark another reason 
why the subject level matters. It is possible that sometimes if the subject 
level evidently contradicts truth, then this damages the theme of the work. 
Imagine, again, 1984 and that totalitarian orders were tendentiously and un-
realistically depicted. Consequentially, it is hard to think that the subject 
could serve as an inspiration for the audience to be engaged with its theme. 
Such a fact, Lamarque might reply, is not a problem for his theory, because 
he would indicate that this is only a literary failure, and not an epistemolog-
ical failure.   
In fact, Lamarque says something analogous to cases that he analyzes. 
In such cases Lamarque says that there are literary works that must rely on 
reality, but the constraint is not based on the value of veracity as such, but 
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on genre conventions.  Among the examples there are historical novels and 
satires like David Lodge’s Small World (Lamarque, 2009, 230-231). 
 
 
 
10. Genre conventions 
 
Contrary to what Lamarque argues, it seems to us that it is appropriate to 
conclude that the advance of knowledge is a primary goal and, therefore, not 
a side effect of the genre. As Lamarque says, satires are effective “precisely 
because of the balance they strike between exaggeration and recognized fact. 
If the exaggeration becomes too extreme and implausible – flouting a con-
vention of satire – then the works lose their appeal” (Lamarque, 2009, 231). 
In our opinion, the exaggeration must not be too extreme primarily because 
of a constraint related to a cognitive and moral goal of satire: to describe the 
moral and personal features of some people, and to provoke an appropriate 
reaction in the audience. Lodge’s intention was to represent the futility, va-
cuity and pretentiousness of (part) of the academic world.  An extreme exag-
geration would be unfair to this reality, for example, depicting people as 
stupid and ignorant, and this would be a failure for the purpose of the satire 
As regards historical novels, we can see two targets in them. One is relat-
ed to the creation of national myths. These novels obviously want to influ-
ence beliefs, but we do not think that we may take them as advancements of 
knowledge. Because of their function, they cannot fulfill the advance of 
knowledge. But it seems to us that at least one of the proper values of histor-
ical novels is an enjoyment in learning about past through literary means 
(Cfr. Rowe, 1997, 339-341). A reader would be seriously disappointed if she 
comes to know that she was misinformed by a historical novel. The conclu-
sion is that the genre convention that attributes trustworthiness to historical 
novels is related to the epistemic expectations of the consumers of literary 
works, which makes the advance of knowledge as one of the proper values of 
historical novels. Why, otherwise, there would be such a genre convention, 
or, we may say, such a genre? 
But the genre conventions that protect truth in the case of satires and 
historical novels exist in other literary cases, as well. We say this about po-
litical theatre, for example. We cannot see how engagement with such art-
works can be detached from the estimation of their relation with truth. We 
think the same about, for example, artworks that speak about relevant mor-
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al issues, like in the case of the tragedies that we mentioned above.  
 
 
11. Moral value as a part of artwork’s artistic value 
 
Our next problem is to try to see whether we can answer the problems relat-
ed to the thesis that the moral value of an artwork influences its artistic val-
ue. This corresponds, for example, to the thesis that the fact that an artwork 
improves us morally (for example, by improving our moral understanding) is 
part of its artistic value, or to the thesis that immoral content decreases the 
artistic value of artworks. The stance can be affirmed from more radical to 
more moderate positions. There are mainly two possible doctrines in the dis-
cussion on whether aesthetic and moral values are, and in what way, inter-
connected, and at the same time, should we take moral value as a value rele-
vant for the evaluation of art (for artistic value). These are autonomism and 
moralism that have radical or moderate versions.  
So, the core of the debate turns on the question whether moral defects 
and/or moral values influence the broad aesthetic of the artwork and in what 
way.  Autonomism holds that the moral character of a work is irrelevant to 
its value as a work of art, and that evaluation of art should be strictly fo-
cused on an artwork's narrow aesthetic properties. The most radical version 
of this doctrine is called radical autonomism/ radical aestheticism14 that says 
that it is inappropriate to involve moral or any other properties, besides nar-
row aesthetic ones, in the evaluation of art. Advocates of autonomism do not 
deny existence of all sorts of different properties and values related to art-
works, but they think that we should appreciate narrow aesthetic autonomy 
when evaluating art and restrain from including these other values into ac-
counts of artistic value. Formalism, usually seen as a form of autonomism, 
says that in the evaluation of art, we should take only formal features of art 
into account.   A moderate version of autonomism, also known as sophisti-
cated aestheticism, states that an artwork’s moral character may influence 
its intrinsic value - where such value is conceived primarily if not exclusively 
in aesthetic terms - but does not do so necessarily. The main idea is that an 
                                                 
14 We use the expressions autonomism and aestheticism interchangeably since 
autonomism stands for emphasizing the notion of autonomy of a narrow aesthetic value 
and consequently of artistic value, and aestheticism stands for underlining the im-
portance of a narrow aesthetic value.  
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artwork’s moral character influences its value indirectly if that moral char-
acter blemishes or promotes an artwork’s aesthetically valuable properties.  
Moralism in its radical version, often called ethicism (the position of 
Gaut to whom we have referred above), centers around the claim that the 
moral character of artwork is crucial to our appreciation and evaluation of 
that work. This doctrine says that an artwork’s value is entirely determined 
by its moral character. Moral value, when it manifests ethically excellent at-
titudes, supports the aesthetic value of an artwork, and when it manifests 
morally repugnant attitudes counts as an aesthetic blemish.  
A moderate formulation of this moralism states that the moral value of a 
work is sometimes relevant to its artistic value, and it is so to the extent it 
decreases or promotes the intelligibly and imaginative experience provided 
by the work. The moral value of artwork is relevant to its overall artistic 
value because sometimes moral defects can count as aesthetic defects, and 
moral merits can count as aesthetic ones, but this isn’t necessarily so (Car-
roll, 1998, 419). The important feature of this doctrine is insisting on eliciting 
the right (emotional) response in an audience. If an artwork fails to achieve 
the right moral response, it will count as an aesthetic failure (Carroll, 1996, 
233). 
 
 
12. Immoral artworks 
 
The problem for all positions that affirm the moral relevance for artistic val-
ue is represented by highly evaluated artworks that are nevertheless, beyond 
any doubt considered immoral. On the contrary, this may not be a problem 
for Lamarque, because of the fact that he says that although moral dimen-
sions of artworks unquestionably exist, the moral value of a literary work 
has only a limited influence on the overall artistic value of the work. Pre-
cisely, as we have seen, the artwork must engage in depth with permanent 
issues of human concern, and defects in this are artistic failures. But, the 
moral vision of the artwork does not have constraints as, for example, of be-
ing true.  
In our opinion, the problem of immoral artworks is frequently overesti-
mated and for this reason we offer some distinctions. First, we have the sim-
plest situation that is represented by works whose subject is immoral but 
moralise about it. Among such works there are, for example, The Picture of 
Dorian Gray, Lolita, and Dangerous Liaisons. Such works appear as im-
The Moral and Cognitive Value of Art 
499 
 
moral in their subject, but, to maintain Lamarque’s distinction, moralise at 
the thematic level and, consequently, cannot properly be judged as immoral. 
We put in this category Hemingway’s story The Short Happy Life of Fran-
cis Macomber, the work discussed by Eileen John. She points out that this 
short story wouldn’t be better if it didn’t have moral flaw. Since it is a story 
of overcoming fear and humiliation as a test of a human worth, as John 
says, it “needs its wrong-headed moral framework to be the excellent story 
that it is” (John, 2006, 334). 
Second, we have artworks with immoral dimensions without judgement. 
The artwork simply shows an immoral perspective.  As an example we can 
use Agota Kristof’s book, Trilogy. Perhaps the most morally problematic is 
the first book, called The Notebook. It is a story that describes the lives of 
nameless twins that grow up in a Hungarian village near the border, during 
the 2nd World war. They live with their evil grandmother, and they find 
ways to survive the war. On the one hand they can be extremely friendly 
and caring, for example for the girl next door, on the other hand they are 
two extremely awful boys who steal, deceive, betray and even murder when-
ever they think this is needed, and feel no remorse about this. However, 
what is extremely important is that through reading Kristof’s work we gain 
an insight into another perspective, one that calls for us to reconsider our po-
sitions, opens up the question of morality to us and the legitimacy of some 
procedures, and raises questions such as does a crime need a motive, or can a 
crime pass unpunished and similar. Although the moral value pictured by 
Kristof is directly opposed to our ordinary moral values, there is a cognitive 
value present in her work in the way that it enables us to become better ac-
quainted with a morally questionable perspective, so that we can confront it 
more effectively. Similar examples are offered by Eileen John. In discussing 
artworks that shows a different (a)moral world and considering what it 
would be like to live in one, she mentions, as examples of amoralism, the 
movies Trainspotting and The Talented Mr. Ripley. 
Third, we have works that are immoral where immoralism is at the same 
time presented as beautiful, good and desirable. They hide the reality, which 
is judged as immoral according to values that are generally accepted. Here 
we can mention Triumph of the Will by Leni Reifenstahl. This is a contro-
versial work that extols Hitler and the National Socialist Party. Due to its 
formal and narrow aesthetic characteristics it is considered to be one of the 
greatest works of documentary film, although it's moral dimension is culpa-
ble. So, the first thing we can say is identical to what we said earlier, when 
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speaking about cognitive value. An artwork can lack cognitive or moral 
value, but nevertheless has aesthetic merits in the narrow sense. But in fact 
the moral and cognitive value of this film is important. Leni Reifenstahl tells 
us to watch a work that we consider morally defective as something beauti-
ful. Nevertheless, we find the film important, amongst other things, for this 
reason, because it offers us the possibility to exercise our intuitions con-
nected to moral defects and the wrong vision that the film offers, but also 
the possibility to have a better understanding of Nazism, as well. For exam-
ple, the film helps many people to understand the value of community, and 
this is important in order to organize proper social politics that balance in a 
proper way the value of individuality and the value that the community has 
for many, in order to avoid extremist degenerations. The value of the film, 
therefore, can be found amongst other things in the point that it is a chal-
lenging case, which offers a new way of enhancing moral understanding of a 
phenomenon of great moral importance. Considering these things, we think 
that the similar (but of course not so disturbing) example is proposed by 
John’s giving the story about her reading of The Portrait of the Lady. She 
mentions that, when she first read the book, she was disappointed by Isa-
bel’s choice, but after the second time she came to appreciate her decision 
given the circumstances of her world. John states that she offered these ex-
amples in order to show that artwork sometimes can be partly valued for its 
morally commendable character. In this last example, the value of such an 
artwork is that it made her rethink, especially in the second reading, Isabel 
Archer’s life story, and even without having an emotional and moral re-
sponse, the experience of reading did have a moral importance and was the 
cause of her strong reaction  (John, 2006, 334-336). 
 
 
 
13. Cognitive and moral value relevance in institutional framework 
 
We conclude with further remarks that intend to show why Lamarque 
would have to embrace the thesis that the cognitive and moral dimensions of 
artworks are relevant for the artistic value of artworks. He supports the in-
stitutional account of literature. It is within the institution of art that we 
“investigate the role of authors and readers and the nature of literary works” 
(Lamarque, 2009, 61), and “the existence of literary works depends on a set 
of conventions concerning how they are created, appreciated, and evaluated; 
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in other words, on attitudes, expectations, and responses found in authors 
and readers” (Lamarque, 2009, 62). Included in this, there is an invitation to 
“readers to reflect, on thematic ideas that both bind together and transcend 
the immediate subject portrayed” (Lamarque, 2010, 79). Related to the 
thematic ideas, Lamarque remarks the expectation of “moral seriousness, in 
the sense of some broad human interest raised and developed. […] Readers 
of literary works will have a conventional expectation that humanly inter-
esting themes will be explored and developed through the subject presented” 
(Lamarque, 2009, 63). 
But, if literary works can advance knowledge (and Lamarque does not 
deny this: “indeed it can be shown that fiction is an especially apt vehicle for 
certain kinds of learning” (Lamarque, 2006, 133); “It seems all too easy to 
find both factual and universal truths in works of literature (notably novels) 
and to discover instances where readers learn through novels” (Lamarque, 
2010, 79) and some of them are not substitutable, as it happens in the case 
when experiences of the artworks provide insights (Lamarque and Olsen, 
1994, 288), and if literary works are shaped in an institutional framework 
that establishes how they are appreciated and evaluated, as well as the prop-
er expectations of readers, it becomes a strong argument. This has been put 
forward by James Young (Young, 2001, 1-22) in defending the claim that 
the advance of knowledge – and not only moral seriousness as indicated by 
Lamarque –, is one of the fundamental values of literary works (to be sure, 
contrary to Lamarque, Young speaks about art in general). 
Young’s argument starts by (i) the interest we have in the production of 
the greatest number of artworks with the greatest possible value. Then, (ii) 
Young reminds us that the advance of knowledge is a great human value, 
and (iii) that artworks can advance knowledge in an important way, even in 
a distinctive way (in Young’s opinion, artworks give a specific contribution 
to the advance of knowledge as illustrative representations, in opposition to 
sciences and philosophy that give their contribution with semantic represen-
tations) (Young, 2001, 23-113). As a consequence, in the expectations we 
have about artworks in the institutional shaping of art it would be reasona-
ble to put not only moral seriousness but,  also to include the advance of 
knowledge, and not to leave it as a side effect.15 
At this point, Lamarque might remark that the advance of knowledge is 
                                                 
15 For the value of having the institution of literature considered as art, see also (Feagin, 
2010, 92)  
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not a distinctive virtue of art (he speaks only of literature, but as usual we 
extend the discussion). It is a virtue shared with sciences, philosophy, etc. 
From this, Lamarque concludes that the advance of knowledge cannot be a 
value of literature as literature. We do not see any reason for this conclusion, 
i.e. we do not see any reason not to assume that some shared virtues are at 
the same time values of literature as literature (or, in our discussion, of art as 
art). This is in the same way as contributing to the making of comfortable 
and safe objects is a value of architecture, although it is shared by civil engi-
neering. But, there is a further and more important reason. Authors like 
James Young say that the contribution of art to the advance of knowledge is 
specific, it is different from how philosophy and science contribute to the 
advance of knowledge (although not deserving of a lesser reputation, as we 
have shown earlier) Consequently, its distinctive contribution to the advance 
of knowledge represents a distinctive value (Cf. Currie, 1995, 911). 
Young’s thesis may be a valuable starting point to answering 
Lamarque’s objection that sometimes attempts to contribute to the advance 
of knowledge reduce the artistic value of artworks, like in the case of didactic 
works and the frequently mentioned Uncle Tom’s Cabin. Perhaps, this is so 
because in such cases the cognitive role is not explicated as well, i.e. these 
artworks try to contribute to the advance of knowledge by imitating philos-
ophy’s or science’s way of representing, instead of making use of the peculiar 
artistic means.  
To be sure, the last thesis that we offer is again conditional to 
Lamarque’s endorsement of the institutionalist thesis. Eileen John would 
say that we might be more ambitious because she says that art needs to jus-
tify its value anyway, and that for this reason it must remark upon its po-
tentialities to satisfy what is of value for human beings: “The idea is that 
there is an invitation built into the existence of art, inviting us to ask wheth-
er the work is worth having at all”. (John, 2006, 340) This, as John says, 
does not put a mechanically moral value (we may add the value of the ad-
vance of knowledge) among artistic values. But art “seizes on whatever it 
can in order to make itself matter to us in this larger way. We happen to 
need to have moral matters explored and presented accurately, and we often 
take great satisfaction in that process as well” (John, 2006, 340). But Daniel 
Jacobson denies that this is how moral and epistemological values can be-
come artistic values. There may be an artwork that satisfies important hu-
man needs without being of great artistic value (Jacobson, 2006, 349-350). 
 We do not enter in this wider debate, here. We limit ourselves to the 
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institutionalist perspective endorsed by Lamarque. He supposes that there is 
such a clear institutional framework. We are not without uncertainties that 
this is so. Anyway, if there is more than one institutional framework, we 
may rationally choose, as Young says, the one that includes the appreciation 
of values of art that in the best way embraces the values that we, as human 
beings, can receive from art. Or, if there is only one established tradition, 
there is no reason not to reform it in order to maximize the benefits that we 
can receive from art. We endorse the suggestion of Simon Blackburn (who, 
however, speaks against the institutional shaping of the proper approaches 
to artworks) that a person does not approach an artwork inappropriately if 
she opens her mind to aspects of a work (like those cognitive) but she “may 
feel short of reading something well as literature if [she is] blind to enough 
aspects of it” (Blackburn, 2010, 88). In accordance with this suggestion, we 
support openness in the institutional framework of arts for the artistic eval-
uation of everything that art can offer of value to humanity, and we do not 
see any reason to exclude anything from the appropriate artistic evaluation 
of artworks if it is based on artistic features like “the subject matter, the 
quality of writing, and the structure of the novel” (Feagin, 2010, 91). 
After all, in the examples of institutional frameworks put forward by 
Lamarque the rule-governing of practices is not casual, but intended to op-
timize the functions of the practices. This is true, for example, for the admin-
istration of law (Lamarque and Olsen, 1994, 257), as well as chess, or cards 
(Lamarque, 2009, 268). 
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